MY AMERICAN JOURNEY: Colin Powell

RISING FROM HARLEM TO THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF POWER, COLIN POWELL LOOKS TO HIS--AND THE COUNTRY'S--FUTURE

  • Share
  • Read Later

(10 of 16)

Within two days, George Bush expanded his objectives to include ousting Saddam from Kuwait. Thus, preparations began to assemble a force that would eventually total 541,000. During the course of the next few months, Powell would make thousands of decisions, ranging from helping to pick a name for the defensive part of the operation (Peninsula Shield and Crescent Shield were rejected in favor of Desert Shield) to getting around Riyadh's insistence that religious services for Jewish soldiers could not be held on Saudi soil (choppers picked up Jewish soldiers and brought them to ships stationed in the gulf to worship).

At one point, Cheney asked Powell to explore hypothetical nuclear-strike options against Iraqi units. Powell responded , "We're not going to let that genie loose.'' Cheney agreed, but he was curious to know what would be required. "The results unnerved me," recalls Powell. "To do serious damage to just one armored division dispersed in the desert would require a considerable number of small tactical nuclear weapons. I showed this analysis to Cheney and then had it destroyed.''

The air war began in Iraq on Jan. 17, 1991, one day after the U.N. Security Council deadline for Saddam to leave Kuwait had passed. The bombing went so well that by mid-February, Bush was eager to start the ground offensive. Powell relayed the President's wishes to Schwarzkopf, but setting a date proved to be trickier than Powell expected.

Norm Schwarzkopf, under pressure, was an active volcano. I occasionally found myself in transoceanic shouting matches with him that were full of barracks profanity. The cussing meant nothing; blowing up acted as a safety valve for his frustrations. Cheney occasionally required my reassurance that we had the right man in Riyadh; at one point, he said, "This is for all the marbles, you know. The presidency is riding on this one. Are you absolutely confident about Schwarzkopf?" I told him that my faith in Norm was total.

On Feb. 20, Norm called saying he had talked to his commanders and needed still another delay to start the ground war, to the 26th. He had the latest weather report in hand, he said, and bad weather was predicted for the 24th and 25th, maybe clearing on the 26th. Bad weather equaled reduced air support, which equaled higher casualties. I was on the spot. So far, Cheney had accepted my counsel. But now I did not feel that Norm was giving me sufficiently convincing arguments to take back to Cheney and the President. What should I expect next, a postponement to the 28th?

"Look," I told Norm, "10 days ago you told me the 21st. Then you wanted the 24th. Now you're asking for the 26th. I've got a President and a Secretary of Defense on my back. You've got to give me a better case for postponement. I don't think you understand the pressure I'm under."

Schwarzkopf exploded. "You're giving me political reasons why you don't want to tell the President not to do something militarily unsound!" He was yelling. "Don't you understand? My Marine commander says we need to wait. We're talking about Marines' lives." He had to worry about them, he said, even if nobody else cared.

  1. 1
  2. 2
  3. 3
  4. 4
  5. 5
  6. 6
  7. 7
  8. 8
  9. 9
  10. 10
  11. 11
  12. 12
  13. 13
  14. 14
  15. 15
  16. 16