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Blair House left Clinton to ponder his campaign pledge. In public he now calls his promise to cut the deficit in half in four years "a goal." Privately he understands that a true halving (in absolute dollars) would require a gasoline tax and other levies he is loath to impose. Eventually, the political trick will probably involve redefining the problem, either by 1) claiming that halving the deficit as a ratio of the debt to the gross domestic product should be considered a promise fulfilled or 2) arguing that there are different kinds of deficits, and that any funds appropriated for long-term improvements like public works projects should be viewed as welcome investments rather than as crippling and wasteful current-consumptio n expenditures.
But changing the terms of reference is tomorrow's problem. To push far- reaching reforms like an overhaul of the nation's health-care system, and to ensure that any temporary fiscal stimulus is inextricably tied to a long- term deficit-reduction scheme, Clinton had to decide how exactly to spread the bad news he got at Blair House. He had already become famous for downplaying whatever encouraging economic statistics have come along, and he followed suit within hours of Blair House. But he knew the mega-message would be better received if it were broached first by a third party whose analysis he could thereafter second. This is the key to understanding Clinton's governing style. As the historian Arthur Schlesinger notes, Clinton views successful leadership as a process of persuasion rather than preachment. Throughout the campaign, Clinton scored repeatedly by engaging voters in a dialogue that demonstrated his knowledge of public issues while at the same time convincing his audiences that he heard their concerns and was actually learning from the colloquy.
While it seemed that Clinton had merely adapted his campaign techniques to * reflect the fact that many people take their cues from television talk shows, he had actually (and typically) studied the problem of changing perceptions quite rigorously. A treatise Clinton has found particularly useful in this regard is Reich's book The Power of Public Ideas. The central tenet of Reich's argument is contained in two sentences: "The core responsibility of those who deal in public policy . . . is not simply to discover as objectively as possible what people want for themselves . . . It is also to provide the public with alternative visions of what is desirable and possible, to stimulate deliberation about them, provoke a reexamination of premises and values, and thus to broaden the range of potential responses and deepen society's understanding of itself." Or, as Franklin Roosevelt once said, "All our great Presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified." As an admirer of both Reich and Roosevelt, Clinton views their analyses as crucial to his overarching goal. His proudest achievement so far, he says -- his "enduring legacy" -- is that he taught the people of Arkansas to "think long term. It's what I want most to do nationwide. It won't be easy and it will require a constant dialogue with the country, but it has to be done and I mean to do it."