(10 of 19)
That meeting, too, led to an impasse. When it seemed that progress had become impossible, I played a wild card. Although the British in fact told us nothing of their military plans, the Argentines plainly believed that we knew everything the British did. Possibly this misconception could be useful. I called Bill Clark at the White House on an open line, knowing that the Argentinians would monitor the call, and told him in a tone of confidentiality that British military action was imminent.
At 2 a.m., new proposals were delivered to me at the hotel. We met the following afternoon, but after eight hours of haggling, Galtieri drew me aside and said, "If I lay it all on the line, I won't be here." I asked him how long he thought he would survive if he lost a war to the British. Gradually, it became apparent what the difficulty had been. If Galtieri did not hold the power of decision, neither did the junta. On every decision, the government apparently had to secure the unanimous consent of every corps commander in the army and their equivalents in the navy and air force. Progress was made by syllables and centimeters, then vetoed by men who had never been part of the negotiations.
Just before midnight, Galtieri reconvened the junta, and by 2:40 a.m. on April 19, we had a draft providing for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal offerees, an Argentine presence under a U.S. guarantee, and negotiations leading to a resolution of the question by the end of 1982.
The engines of my jet were already turning when Costa Mendez arrived. He drew an envelope from his pocket, advising me to open it after I was airborne. As the wheels lifted off the runway, I read Costa Méndez's words: "It is absolutely essential and conditio sine qua non that negotiations will have to conclude with a result on Dec. 31, 1982. This result must include a recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands." Once again, in an exercise of bad faith unique in my experience as a negotiator, the Argentines had gone back on their word and returned to their original, impossible terms. War was now inevitable.
On May 2, the submarine H.M.S. Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano; at least 300 men were lost in a crew of some 1,000. Two days later, an Argentine Exocet missile struck the British destroyer Sheffield, which was abandoned with the loss of 20 men. British troops stormed the Falklands on May 21, and the badly overmatched Argentine force surrendered 3½ weeks later.
Mrs. Thatcher was by far the strongest, the shrewdest and the most clear-sighted player in the game. A statesman is a leader who, knowing where the true interests of the nation lie, resists counsel that .clashes with conviction. Margaret Thatcher belongs in that company. But when I say that in the Falklands, the West was given a great victory by Britain, I do not mean the defeat of Argentinian soldiers by British soldiers. British arms prevailed, but principle triumphed. The will of the West was