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Last week, speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, he reported some good news about the economy's recovery from the recession, but failed to give any convincing explanation of why he thought that he could now control inflation when he has been unable to for the past four years. That too has been part of his learning experience. He admits being caught off guard by inflation, though a Governor who was in office during the 1973 oil embargo and who uses OPEC as his scapegoat should not have been. "This enormous buildup in oil prices has driven inflation high and interest rates high all over the world," Carter told a town meeting in Nashville. "Had I known ahead of time that would happen, I would have put much more emphasis the first couple of years on controlling inflation than I did."
Carter has generally tried to steer a conservative course, a rare and difficult goal for a Democratic President, but his compass has been erratic. He has actually introduced four anti-inflation plans. None have had much impact, partly because he has been reluctant to propose the kind of slashing required to get the federal budget into balance—provided he could have pushed such cuts through Congress. Last whiter the Administration submitted its normal budget, but then, when stunned by fresh inflation figures and an anticipated deficit of $16 billion, rushed out another in six weeks.
One reason for the scrambling was politics—Democratic politics. In the fall, when the Administration economists were preparing the budget, the President and his advisers worried about the challenge on the left from Kennedy. Cutting social programs could cost them important liberal support. But when inflation soared instead of dipping as they expected, and the Kennedy challenge started to fade, Carter rushed to the right to avoid being outflanked by Ronald Reagan, then starting to hit his stride.
In foreign policy, Carter missed his chance to get a SALT II treaty—essentially completed under President Ford —early in his Administration. By trying to sell far bigger cuts in nuclear arms to the Soviets, Carter almost derailed the whole SALT process and had vast difficulties finally negotiating the treaty, which is still unratified by Congress. Nevertheless, the President repeatedly cites his commitment to arms control and Reagan's opposition to the SALT pact as the most significant issue on which they differ in this election. Carter's position is clearly more realistic because SALT II promises at least a modest cap on the Soviet arms buildup and Reagan has not satisfactorily explained why the Soviets would accept the deep cuts he wants any more than those proposed by Carter.
On other matters, the reality of America's diminishing authority in the world was reflected in the Administration's problems to date in securing the release of the hostages in Tehran, to reverse Soviet expansionism in Africa or in Afghanistan, or to bring influence to bear in the Persian Gulf.