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Germany. In a complete break with Bonn's postwar policy, which was to ignore and isolate East Germany, Brandt devised a fresh formula: "Two German states within one German nation." But he refused to agree to Party Leader Walter Ulbricht's demand for full diplomatic recognition. Rather, he hopes to establish relations on an equal basis between the two Germanys,
neither of which is fully sovereign under the war-won rights of the Big Four. Says Brandt of his efforts toward some form of conciliation: "The Germans must be at peace with themselves so that the world can be at peace with Germany."
MAD RACE TO MOSCOW. Though a clear majority of West German adults support the general aim of the Ostpolitik according to public opinion polls, Brandt's departures have provoked some criticism from his West German countrymen. One sampling showed that 48% of West Germans objected to Brandt's kneeling in Warsaw as "exaggerated," while 41% felt it was appropriate. The Springer press, West Germany's largest newspaper chain, never misses an opportunity to berate Brandt.
In Western Europe and the U.S., some skeptics fear that Bonn will unknowingly do Moscow's work of sowing dissent in the West. Other Western experts are struck by the irony that while Brandt sees his policy as an instrument for gradually changing the status quo, the Kremlin views the same policy as a means of consolidating it. Reflecting the concern of some high U.S. officials, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recently declared that Brandt should be "cooled off" as part of an American effort to halt "the mad race to Moscow." Though the U.S. embassy in Bonn has voiced no such complaints, the Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger protests that the West Germans are not consulting closely enough with the Americans. That is an ironic turnabout; it is precisely what the West Germans were saying a few years ago when the U.S. was secretly negotiating the nuclear nonproliferation treaty with the Soviets.
The Nixon Administration publicly supports Brandt's Ostpolitik, and State Department spokesmen are continually denying rumors of Washington-Bonn friction. Nonetheless, there is the problem of a difference in perspective between Bonn and Washington that inevitably causes some disagreements. U.S. diplomats are only too keenly aware of the Soviets' duplicity in the Middle East ceasefire, their covert buildup at the south Cuban port of Cienfuegos and the determined thrust of Russia's navies beyond the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean. In Washington's view, the Soviets are not behaving like a power that wants detente. White House experts object that by ignoring this global pattern and concentrating only on Europe, Brandt's Ostpolitik enables the Soviets to secure their Western flank without having to make any effort to come to terms on a broader basis with the U.S.
Brandt makes it clear that the Ostpolitik notwithstanding, his orientation is still to the West. Soon after taking office, he declared that West Germans would not be "wanderers between two worlds" but would remain firmly moored in the West.
Moreover, he told TIME Correspondent Benjamin Gate:
"Those who were afraid that our policy of normalization vis-a-vis the East would
weaken the Western