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When released last week, the report turned out to be far tougher than most Israelis had expected. "There is virtual hysteria," said Knesset Member David Magen, who belongs to Begin's Herut Party. The report and its consequences dominated the news in Israel all week as the Cabinet met again and again in an effort to decide on a course of action. Three Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, flew home from overseas trips in order to take part in the discussions. Would Sharon quit or be fired? Would Begin himself resign? Would he seek Knesset support for holding early elections, even though this would be opposed by some of the small parties that belong to his Likud coalition? Or would the Prime Minister simply try to ride out the crisis?
In its findings, the commission drew an essential distinction between direct and indirect responsibility for the massacre (see ESSAY). It asserted flatly that the atrocities in the refugee camps were perpetrated by members of the Lebanese Phalangist forces, not by Israeli soldiers. The report described rumors that Israeli soldiers had been in the camps during the massacre as "completely groundless," and it denied that Israeli forces had any prior knowledge that a massacre would occur. It continued: "At the same time, it is clear . . . that the decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger . . . that the Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps . . . Similarly, it is clear that when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these reports. The correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions."
In reconstructing the events of those shocking days, the commission noted that on Wednesday, Sept. 15, the day after the assassination of Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel, Israeli Defense Forces moved into predominantly Muslim West Beirut. That same morning, Israeli Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan told Phalangist commanders, with whom the Israelis had long had friendly ties, that Phalangist forces would be the ones that would enter the Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut. Also that morning, Sharon arrived in Beirut, conferred with his commanders and paid a condolence call on the Gemayel family. Meanwhile, Major General Amir Drori, who headed Israel's northern command, was "not at ease" with the plan to send the Phalangists into the camps. He tried to persuade the commanders of the relatively weak Lebanese army to undertake the assignment. The army leaders, fearful that they would appear to be acting in collusion with the Israeli forces that had so recently occupied West Beirut, said no.