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Haig's successor, George Shultz, has been more adroit and more successful. He also has somewhat more latitude than Reagan's domestic advisers. In foreign policy the President has fewer intense and long-cherished beliefs, and he delves less deeply into the details of decisions. He usually is content to receive a series of one-page "minimemos" summarizing foreign and defense problems and options, even on so complicated a subject as the basing mode for the MX missile. National Security Adviser William Clark sends Reagan a foreign policy paper of ten pages or more only about once a month.
In foreign as in domestic policy, Reagan can be persuaded to change his mind on major issues only if advisers convince him that he really is not doing so. The beliefs that he does have on foreign affairs are very deeply rooted indeed. The strongest is the intense anti-Sovietism that apparently took hold after World War II, when Reagan headed the Screen Actors Guild during a bitter dispute over Communist influence in the movies. Reagan was clearly influenced by the cold war atmosphere. In one of his first presidential press conferences, Reagan said of Soviet leaders, "They reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat." Although he no longer voices that thought publicly, aides say it is a consistent belief.
There are, of course, different ways of being anti-Soviet. Shultz successfully worked around Reagan's preconceptions to get the President to lift U.S. sanctions against the pipeline that is to carry Siberian natural gas to Western Europe. Shultz was convinced that the sanctions were infuriating European allies and would not stop the pipeline, but that is not what he emphasized to Reagan. Instead, Shultz quietly negotiated an agreement under which the Europeans would study coordinated restrictions on trade with the Soviets, and told Reagan that this would be a more effective way of curbing East-West deals that might strengthen the U.S.S.R. militarily. In fact the agreement is so tenuous that it does not commit the Europeans to any specific acts, but Reagan bought it anyway.
On some other foreign policy issues, Reagan's inability to admit that he has changed course has stirred trouble. The President was a vehement champion of Taiwan before taking office, but he appreciates the strategic necessity of close U.S. relations with the Chinese Communists, who share his distrust of the Soviets. Characteristically, Reagan has tried to have it both ways. He signed a communique last August calling for a gradual reduction in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan leading to a "final resolution," presumably a cutoff. American right-wingers howled that he was betraying Taiwan. Stung, Reagan insisted athat "there has been no retreat by I me, no change whatsoever. We will S continue to arm Taiwan"—although |the language of the communique E plainly suggested the opposite. The i ploy has not worked. Reagan's words 5 have annoyed the Communist Chinese without mollifying the American right.