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Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger has scarcely helped. He got off to a good start by warning in February that the shutoff of oil exports from Iran had created a situation " prospectively more serious than the Arab oil embargo" of 1973-74. That statement was widely dismissed as alarmist, but it now seems only too accurate. Lately, the Secretary's statements have been so contradictory that one oil executive exclaims: "The real odd-and-even plan is Schlesinger's assessment of the energy situation!"
The fundamental difficulty is that the U.S. cannot import enough oil right now to fill its needs. Imports are running about 8 million bbl. a day—roughly half of U.S. consumption, up 3% just since late April —but oilmen estimate that they need an other 500,000 to 1 million to assure an even flow of all products through their refineries. The prime reason for the shortage is that the other members of OPEC have never increased production enough to make up for the curtailment of supplies from Iran. The situation raises two questions: 1) Which products should be rushed out? The Department of Energy has never seemed able to make up its mind whether to urge maximum output of gasoline or of distillates (heating oil and diesel fuel), though last week Schlesinger came down firmly on the side of distillates. 2) How fast should refineries run down their stocks of crude oil in order to supply gasoline, heating oil and other end-products right now?
Oilmen have been trying to build up stocks of crude, so that they can assure a continued flow of supplies and guard against another interruption like that caused by the Iranian revolt. Two weeks ago, Schlesinger accused them of being "unduly conservative," and even threatened to take crude away from some refiners and give it to others who would process it faster. That sounded like an endorsement of the conspiracy theory that oilmen are deliberately withholding supplies to force up prices—or at the very least take advantage of the higher prices sure to come.
Last week Schlesinger hastened to make amends, and succeeded in getting still more deeply mired. He conceded that the dispute over the proper balance between crude stocks and refinery runs is a legitimate difference of opinion, and he softened the threat to take crude away from refiners who do not use it rapidly enough. His reason: if he did that, the refiners might retaliate by importing less oil. Startled reporters asked if the Government was yielding to oil-company blackmail. No, no, said Schlesinger, no company had made any such threat; he was merely worried that he has no authority to force oilmen to import as much crude as they can find to buy.
Congress has hardly covered itself with glory either. It has buried such mild conservation bills as one to curtail outdoor lighting displays, and in May the House voted down a Carter plan to set up a stand-by gasoline-rationing plan that could be imposed in a real emergency.
Now Congressmen who seem at last to realize the severity of the situation—partly, perhaps, because they too must wait on gasoline lines in Washington—are scurrying to introduce energy bills of all sorts.