(3 of 4)
There is no alternative to the Sadat-Begin negotiations. Geneva as a negotiating forum is dead. This is just as well. It could only have led to a deadlock or to an imposed settlement, and in either case to an enlarged Soviet influence. Were Sadat and Begin somehow to fail to find solutions, lower-level diplomats meeting around a conference table in Switzerland later could scarcely be expected to succeed. In short, failure now would make conflict later inevitable. Israel would return to its ghetto existence; Egypt would face a war its people dread.
The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. Major progress is therefore likely. Geneva could be useful later in ratifying what has been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties to join the negotiating process.
An Egyptian-Israeli agreement is not inimical to an overall settlement but the condition for it. The choice has never been between an overall and a partial settlement, but between a partial settlement as a first step and no settlement at all. A step toward peace is better than the continuation of conflict, all the more so since both President Sadat and Premier Begin have committed themselves to an overall settlement.
An Egyptian-Israeli agreement should involve principles applicable to the other parties. Sadat and Begin are too wise not to base progress between Egypt and Israel on principles that have wider application. They know from history that to be lasting a peace must in time reach out to all principal parties and that those parties will support it only if they participate in making it. The day will come when Arab leaders who now denounce the Sadat initiative will be grateful that the largest of Arab nations took on its own shoulders the burden of the first and most difficult decision for peace. By solving the psychological problem, Egypt has now made it possible to overcome the other obstacles to peace everywhere in the Middle East. This is why coupling the Egyptian negotiations with the Palestinian issue is important both substantively and symbolically. At the same time, on this issue where distrust and hatred have gone so deep, it may be best to set a general course and leave details for later negotiations.
Having had the privilege of working closely with the President of Syria, I am convinced that he will not turn his back on a genuine peace. In the context of Syria's turbulent history and its internal pressures, in the light of its perception of itself as the embodiment of true Arab nationalism, President Assad has sought to keep open the option of negotiation. This attitude should be nurtured.