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Tantrums. To some of his critics at home, Nixon seemed to be acting as much out of petulance as out of any thoughtful diplomatic or military stratagems. James Reston of the New York Times called it "war by tantrum." But the Administration, as L.B.J. liked to say, simply hunkered down, keeping its own counsel. At the time of the Cambodian invasion and during the resumption of the bombing last spring, Nixon had taken his case to the American people over television. This time there was no TV appearance, no explanation or rationale offered. The first news of the attacks came not from the White House but from Radio Hanoi. Nixon imposed a press blackout on all but the skimpiest details of the raids, and ordered everyone from Cabinet officials to bomber pilots to keep silent. Inquiries about civilian casualties were met with the catechism, "We have targeted and continue to target only military targets." Reporters accompanying the Bob Hope Christmas show to airbases in Thailand were sternly warned not to ask pilots any questions except about Bob Hope, Christmas and home.
If anything, it seemed to be less business than usual in official Washington. The President was in Key Biscayne, Fla., for most of the week. Henry Kissinger, his own game plan in disarray, went to a Washington Redskins football game, then flew to Palm Springs, Calif., for a New Year's vacation. There, at one point, photographers discovered him strolling with Hollywood Executive Bob Evans. Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig, was "on leave," and outgoing Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was in Hawaii saying farewell to the Pacific Command. Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler was on a week's vacation in California. Behind this all too casual facade was the Administration's determination that once the decision to bomb had been made, there was little to do but keep the line to Hanoi open, probing and pushing for the signal that ultimately came.
The original decision to bomb was an instructive case history of the President's mind and decision-making apparatus at work. The move came after Nixon and Kissinger concluded that it was the proper course, and Kissinger, acting for Nixon, had consulted with and won the approval of Secretary of State William Rogers, Melvin Laird, CIA Director Richard Helms, Vice President Spiro Agnew and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Because the agreement was complete, the National Security Council was not called into formal session to debate the proposition to unleash the full fury of U.S. air power on Hanoi.
That fury was unleashed because, in Nixon's view, the North had acted in bad faith in the negotiations. In October, the U.S. says, the North agreed to separate the question of American prisoners from the fate of Vietnamese political prisoners being held by the South Vietnamese government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Subsequently, they demanded that the two issues be treated together—no Americans released unless Thieu also opened his jails. This Nixon refused to do. "One of the President's major considerations" in resuming the bombing, according to one aide, "was the conditions the North Vietnamese attached to the release of American prisoners of war. They welshed on the deal."