DEFENSE: Arming to Disarm in the Age of Detente

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compensating advantages." The most potent is a 7,000-to-3,500 edge in small, tactical nuclear warheads, which can be lofted at the enemy forces by artillery or short-range rockets hi case of attack.

Mutual Reductions. Many people would like to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, but Schlesinger agrees with the Administration position that such a move would be disastrous without equivalent pullbacks by Russia. He views NATO as "the spine and adhesive" that holds off Soviet political pressure and the threat of "Fin-landization" of Europe. For three months, the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have been conducting mutual force reductions talks in Vienna, and the Administration regards keeping American sol diers in Europe as a bargaining chip that will force Soviet concessions. Says Schlesinger: "It would be foolhardy indeed not to give this pro cess a chance to work itself out." So far, however, there has been no visible progress at the talks. The chief diffi culty seems to be finding a way to compensate for the fact that the U.S. would have to withdraw troops across the Atlantic, the Russians only to then-borders near by.

Apart from meeting the Soviet challenge in Europe and elsewhere, Schlesinger must contend with the mo rale problems left over from Viet Nam, the nation's longest and most unpopular war. Some top-ranking officers are still bitter that the politicians interfered with their conduct of the war. Their resentment contributes to a crisis of the military spirit that infects all ranks and may well be more difficult to handle than the manifold problems of race, drugs and discipline.

There has been no decline in applications to the military academies, but officers like Lieut. General Albert P. Clark, superintendent of the Air Force Academy, find "that Viet Nam has made things more difficult. The military image has been tarnished to the point where it is more difficult to make a man proud of the uniform." Explains one instructor at the academy: "When we signed up to go to military school, they gave us parties. When these guys go home on leave, their girl friends won't let them wear their uniforms."

Some officers think that the situation is improving, and that pride in the military is growing again, among enlisted men as well as officers. Brigadier General Charles C. Rogers, commander of the VII Corps Artillery in Stuttgart, finds that "soldiers are beginning to wear their uniforms off duty again. Only a few do it, but that's a step forward." Moreover, he detects "an improvement in morale, military courtesy and readiness to accept traditions. Soldiers still ask 'Why?' and need explanations, but they offer much less resistance."

A more pressing problem to Schlesinger is the efficient use of personnel. Since 1968 U.S. forces have been cut from 3.5 million men and women to 2.2 million (during the same period, Russian forces grew from 3.2 million to 3.4 million). But because of what the military calls "grade creep," the U.S. Army today has one four-star general for every 20,000 men, compared with one for every 145,000 men during the Korean War. The other branches have similarly exaggerated ratios of officers to men. Moreover, only about 15% of servicemen have combat jobs, a larger portion of personnel in noncombat jobs than ever before. Schlesinger

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