THE WHITE HOUSE: The Battle for Nixon's Tapes

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& T affiliate serving the White House sent a letter of inquiry to the Nixon staff, but conceded: "We certainly wouldn't cut off service to the White House."

The Tampering Theory. There are some who insist that the contents of the tapes, if they are ever made public, will have no great impact on the Watergate drama because they will have been doctored to protect the President. Recording experts seem to disagree on whether this can be done without danger of detection. While tapes can readily be spliced, erased and dubbed to add, delete or transpose dialogue, and then retaped, the relative age of the tape can be analyzed. So can the precise acoustics, including inaudible frequencies, so that the exact room setting and microphone placement of any new taping would have to duplicate those of the original. To drag even more conspirators into the Watergate cover-up in an effort to accomplish such slick editing would seem unlikely and dangerous indeed.

Moreover, if Dean's version of various talks with the President is accurate, it would take extensive doctoring of the tapes to get the recordings to reflect the conflicting White House version. Among the tapes that would seem to be especially significant for the Ervin committee are those of the following specific Nixon-Dean talks:

SEPT. 15, 1972. This is the earliest date on which, Dean contends, the President made it clear to him that he was aware of the coverup. He did so, Dean claims, by congratulating him on helping to confine the grand jury indictments to the level of G. Gordon Liddy, the former counsel to the Nixon re-election finance committee. Testified Dean: "The President told me I had done a good job and he appreciated how difficult a task it had been and the President was pleased that the case had stopped with Liddy." Dean claimed that Nixon also said, "That's helpful," when Dean explained that lawyers were making out-of-court contacts with a Washington federal judge in an effort to delay consideration of Democratic Party civil suits until after the election. The White House account asserted that Dean had merely "reported Watergate indictments."

FEB. 27, 1973. Dean testified that he was again congratulated by the President on his Watergate work and that he warned Nixon that he was not sure the investigation "could be contained indefinitely." Nixon, he said, replied that he "was confident" Dean could do so. The White House summary: "Dean suggested White House aides submit answers to interrogatories."

FEB. 28. Dean contends that he reported to the President that the cover-up activities could be considered criminal; most notably, he felt that he, Dean, could be charged with obstruction of justice. The White House version is contradictory: "President inquired of Watergate. Dean said no White House involvement."

MARCH 1 3. Probably the most significant conversation of all. By Dean's account, the President discussed both payoffs and Executive clemency for the convicted wiretappers. Dean said that he thought it might cost $1,000,000 to keep the men quiet. "He told me that that was no problem, and he also looked over at Haldeman and repeated the statement." Later, testified Dean: "The President then referred to the fact that Hunt had been promised Executive clemency. He said that he had

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