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OCT. 26. Word of Hanoi's power play reached Kissinger in Washington at 2 a.m. He called Nixon immediately. The next morning, the two met to discuss the U.S. response, and agreed that Kissinger would go on TV to give the Administration's version. The important thing, they agreed, was to maintain the momentum of peace. Kissinger was thus to address himself primarily to Saigon and Hanoi. With that in mind, he hardly considered the elation his words would cause in the U.S., and was surprised by it, he later admitted. Nixon specifically approved Kissinger's language in the assertion that "we believe that peace is at hand." And Kissinger genuinely believed it. But it was also a purposeful device to reassure Hanoi and warn Saigon of Washington's continued, earnest desire for a settlement.
Part of the strategy succeeded: only six hours later, North Viet Nam cabled agreement to another round in Paris. But Nixon did not want Kissinger to hurry back to Paris too soon; so as not to be accused of playing politics with peace, he had decided not to resume negotiations until after the election. Also, now that the agreement's text was public, the President began to get some other opinions on the merits of the bargain that Kissinger proposed to strike—from the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House staff. Not all were approving. Some of Nixon's old wariness in dealing with Communists may have begun to assert itself.
NOV. 2. Something like that seemed evident in Nixon's TV address on this evening, in which he said that there were "ambiguities" in the plan and these must "be settled before we sign the final agreement." Yet privately Nixon decided that he would stop well short of trying to satisfy all of Thieu's doubts on the sovereignty question. Kissinger was to seek a concession on the DMZ aspect, Nixon ruled, and if he got it, they then would try to force Thieu to sign. If Thieu still refused, the U.S. would make a separate peace with Hanoi.
NOV. 20-25. Kissinger, finally back in Paris, was confident once again that everything could be wrapped up in a day or two. He got the North Vietnamese to agree on language affirming the DMZ as a provisional political division line. But then the talks stalled, apparently because the North Vietnamese were awaiting Politburo consideration of American "clarifications." The two sides broke for an eight-day recess.
NOV. 29. Thieu's special emissary, Nguyen Phu Duc, flew to Washington to tell Nixon that Hanoi's concessions were insufficient. Nixon rejected nearly all of Duc's demands, which included a massive North Vietnamese troop withdrawal. But the President was still bothered about the DMZ; he told Kissinger to bring the issue up again in Paris.
DEC. 3. Apparently anticipating a breakdown in the talks and a resumption of bombing by the U.S., Hanoi began evacuating the capital's schoolchildren to the countryside.
DEC. 4-13. Kissinger, in Paris again, was still optimistic.