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Kissinger reportedly insisted that "we were successful in Peking, we were successful in Moscow, we were even successful in Paris. There is no reason," he added, "why we cannot be successful here." At that point, Thieu's young (29) chief assistant Hoang Duc Nha interrupted Kissinger with a short but heated lecture. "So far," said Nha, "history has shown that the United States has been successful in many fields. But history does not predict that in the future the United States will be successful here."
Thieu played his hand shrewdly, never committing himself either way, always asking for clarification and comparisons between the Vietnamese and the English texts. Still, Kissinger got the impression that Thieu would accede, and so advised Nixon.
OCT. 21. Acting on that assurance, Nixon sent a message to Hanoi asserting that though a few matters needed clarification, "the text of the agreement could be considered complete" and an Oct. 31 signing seemed feasible. The plan was for a bombing and mining halt on Oct. 23; Kissinger would go to Hanoi on Oct. 24 to wrap up the loose ends in a final two-day negotiating session and initial the agreement. Formal signing would take place a week later in Paris.
OCT. 23. At the fifth and last meeting in Saigon, only Kissinger, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Thieu and Nha were present. At last Thieu rendered judgment, and it was devastating. He violently denounced the nine-point plan. He insisted on a total withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces and the establishment of the DMZ as a political frontier. He scorned the proposed interim political body, the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, as a coalition government in disguise.
Nixon, who was already beginning to worry that the Communists might be planning an offensive timed to begin just before the ceasefire, sent a second message to Hanoi. It said that the Oct. 31 signing was not possible because of difficulties in Saigon and asked for a new round of talks. The Hanoi trip was off; Kissinger, startled by the depth of Saigon's apprehensions, left for Washington in a somber mood, conceding to Thieu: "We go along with you."
OCT. 24. Taking his case to the Vietnamese people, Thieu went on TV to emphasize the sovereignty issue, which was to become the core of his objections to the plan. "North Viet Nam is North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam is South Viet Nam," he said. "For the time being one must accept the two Viet Nams, and neither side can invade the other."
OCT. 25. Apparently alarmed by Nixon's pullback from a signing and Thieu's protests, Hanoi broke the secrecy of the agreement and broadcast a summary of its provisions, warning of grave consequences if the U.S. did not sign on Oct. 31. The disclosure was aimed at forcing the U.S. to adhere to the original deal despite Thieu. Scant hours earlier, Kissinger said that he believed there would be a cease-fire in "a few weeks."