South Viet Nam: Limiting the Leadership

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No civilian politician has wielded significant power in South Viet Nam since President Ngo Dinh Diem was over thrown in 1963. A succession of generals and military juntas, in or out of uniform, has ruled the country. Civilian ministers have held office but not authority. Premier Tran Van Huong, appointed in May 1968, was no exception. Last week the affable Huong, who enjoys wide popularity among the Vietnamese people, lost what little power he had. President Nguyen Van Thieu replaced him with General Tran Thien Khiem, 43, the hard-eyed minister in charge of police and pacification.

Rumors of a government reshuffle had been circulating in Saigon for months. Having said that he was willing to com pete openly with the Communists' political arm, the National Liberation Front, Thieu was expected to broaden the makeup of his Cabinet in an effort to match the Front's strong appeal to peas ants and intellectuals. But in firing Huong, a politically independent civilian, and replacing him with a soldier, Thieu seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. Rather than broadening its base, Thieu's government was limiting its leadership to military men. Later appointments could, of course, give the regime a more heterogeneous character. For the time being, though, there was no room at the top for civilians.

Waning Influence. Khiem, who was involved in the overthrow of Diem and masterminded two subsequent coupplots, joins Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, previously the air-force chief, to form an all-military triumvirate. They are expected to take an uncompromising political line at home and at the Paris peace talks.

South Viet Nam's malleable Parliament had set the stage for Huong's removalby claiming that his economic and anticorruption policies were ineffective. To be sure, Huong was an indifferent administrator, a homey type who grows roses and readily admits: "I have never been a revolutionary." Moreover, he is aging (66) and ailing (asthma, rheumatism). Huong's personal shortcomings were not, however, what brought about his dismissal. Thieu, who had not bothered to consult his Premier about major issues for months, apparently wanted a man in whom he had complete confidence to help him through the next political stage in Viet Nam.

U.S. diplomats had strongly urged Thieu to retain a civilian front for his government. Not long ago, such advice might have been swiftly heeded. But with U.S. troops beginning to withdraw, American influence in Saigon is waning and bound to decline further. Former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford wrote recently in Foreign Affairs quarterly that Viet Nam's "political realities are, in the final analysis, both beyond our control and beyond our ken." In putting together his new government, Thieu could prove that point emphatically. His decisions might not only be beyond the control or comprehension of the U.S. but might also prove distasteful to it.