NATO: The View at the Summit

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SHAPE'S commander refused to accept the British argument that nuclear firepower permitted a cut in conventional forces. Instead, he called for a buildup of NATO ground forces in the central sector of Western Europe alone ("the most sensitive and critical line in the world") from the present 18 divisions to about 30. Rejecting the old concept of NATO forces in Europe as a "trip wire" to trigger U.S. nuclear retaliation, Norstad argued: "What we need is a shield—not just a trip wire or burglar alarm, but a shield of some reasonable force. If the Russians meet resistance, they will have to consider the possibility of unleashing the full nuclear deterrent. The enemy must be kept in a position where he has to make The Decision."

Even if Norstad got all the troops he asked for, his international army would still be a pigmy alongside the estimated 130 Russian and 65 satellite divisions in Eastern Europe. This does not alarm NATO planners unduly. "We are not going to fight a war against those divisions," says one NATO planner.

But to help offset numerical inferiority, Norstad proposed what he calls "the concept of graduated readiness." The Norstad plan called for creation of heavily armed "fire brigades" of roughly divisional strength which would be capable of moving swiftly to any part of NATO territory and kept at "120% readiness." Along the Iron Curtain line would be other units in full readiness, airplanes manned, guns loaded, combat tasks assigned. In a second line, farther back, would be divisions capable of going into action in three to four days. Even farther back would be the reserves—divisions that could be ready in 30 days, plus troops committed to NATO but currently on active duty elsewhere, e.g., French forces that have been drawn away from SHAPE for the Algerian war. To ensure that all NATO divisions would be periodically brought up to 100% readiness, the units manning the Iron Curtain line would be rotated regularly.

This was sound but standard military doctrine. What was new was Norstad's proposal for a basic modification of the strategic concept which divides NATO forces into "the shield" (conventional forces in Continental Europe) and "the sword" (U.S. and British nuclear forces based outside Europe). The U.S., argued Norstad, should equip its European NATO allies with short-range and even intermediate-range missiles, train them in the use of such weapons and make nuclear warheads available for quick delivery in case of war. What Norstad was urging, in effect, was that the shield forces be brought to a significant place in NATO's nuclear deterrent power.

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