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As it became clear that De Gaulle and Britain would see it through, one by one French officers came from far places to join his cause. Vice Admiral Emile Henry Muselier, who had been retired by Admiral Darlan, reached England soon after the armistice and was immediately made commander of the Naval Force. Others were slower in arriving. Colonel Martial Valin, now commander of the Air Force, was in Brazil when the armistice was signed. Vichy offered to let him name his own terms if he would stay there. Said Colonel Valin: "I am going to serve France where my conscience dictates," and sailed for England.
Brigadier General Ernest Petit, Chief of the Free French General Staff, was kept in Paraguay during France's part of
the war. On the collapse of France he cabled De Gaulle, stating his reasons in a letter to a staff officer: "When one has to choose between two duties, always take that one whose fulfillment is the most brutal and the most difficult. You can be quite sure that it is the right one." General Paul Louis Le Gentilhomme was sacked by Vichy for continuing the fight in Somaliland. Twelve-times-wounded Colonel Philibert Collet escaped from Syria to join De Gaulle last May.
Le Général. The man who heads Free France is an inexperienced politician, a bad salesman; he was a figure of little personal prestige a year ago. Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle, whom the Free French now call simply Le General, has a too-tall (6 ft. 4 in.) body, big hips, a small head and the undynamic appearance frequently found in big men. But he has the unique advantage of being the one Frenchman who knew what was wrong with the French Army.
He was wounded three times in World War I, was captured and escaped five times, only to be recaptured each time. (Psychological note; De Gaulle's two chief lieutenants, Generals Petit and Catroux, were also notable escapists.) After the war De Gaulle became Professor of Military History at Saint Cyr, afterwards a student at the Staff College. Between 1932 and 1936 he was general secretary of the Superior Council of National Defense, from which vantage point he observed the conditions which led to his two prophetic books.
The first of these was Au Fil de l'Epée (translated as The Philosophy of Command), which advocated individual initiative on the part of commanders instead of the traditional French system of fighting according to plan. Vers l'Armée de Métier (The Army of the Future) went even further in breaking with French tradition.
The army of the future will move on caterpillar treads, De Gaulle wrote in 1934. The Maginot Line is limited in depth and leaves northern France exposed, he warned. The defensive psychology of the Maginot Line "will defeat France." As to the vaunted French morale, "neither bravery nor skill can any longer achieve anything except as functions of equipment." Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain laughed off the book as "witticisms." General Weygand called it "evil." The Germans learned from it.