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The N.L.F. simply declared itself to be a legitimate government, betting on the fact that in such cases, historically, legitimacy belongs to the ultimate victor. State Department Spokesman Robert McCloskey dismissed the new govern ment as "the same old wine in a new bottle," but experts in Washington and Saigon agreed that the change was not without point. The N.L.F. is plainly trying to upgrade its status from revolutionary cabal to one of parity in the world's eyes with the existing Saigon government. Instant diplomatic recognition came from 15 countries—including North Viet Nam, Cuba, North Korea, Algeria and the U.S.S.R.
This maneuver may strengthen the N.L.F.'s bid for a role in a coalition government in South Viet Nam before elections are held—one of the ten N.L.F, points announced May 8. Creation of the provisional government may also embarrass Thieu. He has reluctantly offered to talk with the N L.F , but he might renege if it meant dealing with a self-proclaimed regime that purports to be more legitimate than his own. Thieu denounced the N.L.F, move as "a fabrication concocted by a group of people who take cover in jungles without daring to disclose their location." It is, he said, "a propaganda trick" that has changed nothing.
In Saigon, the announced reduction panicked some businessmen and depressed real estate prices. The government raised taxes—the price of beer, for example, will go up 55%—to finance anticipated increases in the cost of the war. But some influential Vietnamese feel that Nixon's action will help Thieu. "It shows that the U.S. commitment here is not unlimited," says Tran Ngoc Chau, secretary of the lower house of the National Assembly, and therefore it should encourage greater political unity in South Viet Nam. While Thieu faces new opposition from a neutralist group of intellectuals formed two weeks ago, he nonetheless demonstrated refreshing flexibility on several sticky points when he returned from Midway.
The question of what kind of regime is to rule in Saigon remained crucial. In their communique, Nixon and Thieu rejected the imposition of "any particular form of government, such as coalition, without regard to the will of the people of South Viet Nam." This could mean that if a coalition were to come about as the result of free elections, the U.S. would not oppose it or try to keep Thieu in power. Thieu now concedes that elections could be held before they are scheduled under the constitution (1971) and that the N.L.F. could take part. The more immediate problem is how the elections are to be brought about. The Communists demand Thieu's departure from power, or at least a coalition, even before elections are held. They imply that if elections took place with Thieu in command, he would have an enormous advantage at the polls, regardless of any kind of international supervision that might be devised. The U.S., in turn, argues that forcing Thieu into a coalition now, let alone forcing him out of office, would hopelessly prejudge the polling and damage his chances of proving himself in a fair electoral contest.
A Mixed Response