BEHIND President Richard Nixon's decision to begin troop withdrawals, there is a concept for disengaging the U.S. from the war. It is more than a vision, but less than a blueprint. It is flexible, ready to be modified with the shift of events. What Nixon does next depends largely on the Communist response to his announcement last week at Midway. While there are perils m the choice he made, it may prove to be a significant step toward ending the longest war in American history
Nixon's advisers had proposed that he announce withdrawal of as many as 70,000 troops, but with characteristic caution Nixon chose a minimum opening figure of 25,000 (see box, page 18). The number may nonetheless reach 70,000 by the end of this year. Nixon was careful to speak at Midway of their "replacement" by South Vietnamese forces. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird added to the lexicon by christening the plan "Project Vietnamization." By whatever name, Nixon's move was a guarded gamble for peace in South Viet Nam.
By cutting back however slightly the number of Americans fighting in Viet Nam, Nixon sought to mollify the domestic impatience with the war; that dissatisfaction had helped him win election last November. There were countervailing risks. Although some of the troops will be pulled back no farther than Okinawa, Nixon would surely evoke deafening protest in the U.S. in the highly unlikely event that serious military reversals made it necessary to send some of the troops back. The greater danger, however, is that the enemy will simply ignore Nixon's initiative—on the assumption that continued popular op position to the war will eventually force Nixon to concede the Communists a victory at the bargaining table that they have not won on the battlefield.
Nixon therefore devised an intricate strategy directed at Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. By meeting with South Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu and spelling out the common ground between Washington and Saigon, he tried to underline the solidarity of the two governments in the face of Communist efforts to divide and conquer. In giving more combat responsibility to the South Vietnamese, Nixon advertised U.S. confidence—such as it is—in the combat readiness of Saigon's forces. He aims to convince the Communists that they must negotiate with Thieu and not hold out in the expectation of dealing with a more malleable successor. If Nixon can dull dissent at home while maintaining pressure in the field, the Communists may become more amenable to concluding a settlement in Pans or at least to scaling down the level of fighting.
Running Alongside
The Nixon approach carries other concomitant difficulties. The effectiveness of many South Vietnamese combat units remains in doubt, and no one knows for sure whether they will be able to maintain the present military balance as U.S. troops are withdrawn. One South Vietnamese official recently told Secretary of State William Rogers: "It's like a man learning to ride a bicycle. We think we can do it, but you never know until the man running alongside takes his hand away." Thanks to better training, better equipment and massive support from U.S. air and artillery, the South Vietnamese are improving. But they are still no match for the North Vietnamese, especially in leadership and fighting zeal.