(2 of 2)
Half-Measures. The proposals disclosed little sense of realism. A broadened, "elephant" Cabinet would more than likely bog down in the same sort of bickering and flatulent debate that plagued Adoula's ill-fated government. There are few rebel prisoners untainted by the Simba massacres; in fact, there are few rebel prisoners of any kind, because the government soldiers kill their captives with as much dispatch as the Simbas. And the notion of winning over the Lumumbists by means of elections is a delusion. There may be some moderates among the rebels, but Lumum-bism and the whole rebel movement have never been stronger or more militant. Necessary though the Stanleyville intervention was, it did have the unfortunate effect of coalescing Arab and African radical support behind the rebellion. With the northern and eastern borders of the Congo wide open to infiltration, Tshombe, or any other non-Lumumbist leader who might follow him, faces a long, drawn-out guerrilla war.
The most that the U.S.-Belgian proposals might achieve would be to make it easier for such moderate African na tions as Nigeria, Tunisia and Sierra Leone to lend moral support to Tshombe. But what the Congo really needs is increased military and administrative assistance, aimed at building an army that will fight without white leadership and a civil service that won't steal the country blind. Rather than trying to polish Tshombe's ineradicably tarnished image through hopeful half-measures, Brussels and Washington would do better sending him increased logistic and material support. After all, Mike Hoare's small band of "white giants" cannot stand tall forever.