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The question is, Can a Secretary of State do both after he gets slapped down? "He got absolutely cut off at the knees with the early initiatives he took," says a Democratic Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee. "If it were not a person of his stature, it would have killed a Secretary of State."
Pentagon friends say Powell was initially "blown off course" by Bush's basic principle of anything-but-Clinton. "If Clinton was pushing hard for it," says J. Stapleton Roy, ambassador to China for Bush Sr., "their instinct was to pull way back." But every Administration learns--often the hard way--that foreign policy inevitably snaps back from campaign rhetoric to the well-plowed tracks of enduring interests. And it was Powell who bore the brunt of the President's education.
When the Secretary jumped out front on Iraq, pushing to "toughen" crumbling U.N. sanctions against old nemesis Saddam Hussein by making them "smarter," conservatives scoffed that meant weaker. But Powell persuaded the President--because, say aides and rivals alike, he's very effective when he "marshals his facts." The Administration--and Powell--was embarrassed later, when Russia rebuffed the plan.
And as soon as Wolfowitz, a zealous advocate of "regime change" in Baghdad--backing dissidents to overthrow Saddam--settled into his office, he told European parliamentarians that Powell was not the last word on sanctions or Iraq policy. Enthusiasm is building inside the Administration to take down Saddam once and for all. Powell too would love to see Saddam unhorsed, says an official at State. "But you need a serious plan that's doable. The question is how many lives and resources you have to risk." Powell's unwillingness to fight any less-than-total war is legendary, and the particulars of launching a covert insurgency among the feuding Iraqi opposition factions would give any general pause. The proposition is still "hypothetical," he told TIME. But plenty of others on the Bush team are gung-ho.
Powell's public humiliation over North Korea is part of Washington lore. He said the Bush Administration would "pick up where the Clinton Administration left off" in negotiating a missile-proliferation deal with the North. The White House, annoyed that South Korea had just sided with Russia against Bush's missile shield and furious that Powell had uttered the word Clinton, said, No way. The next day Powell had to step out and retract his position. He took the setback stoically, at least in public. When the dust settled, he told reporters, "I got a little far forward on my skis." But friends say he felt "as if he learned his lesson."
Yet Powell was soon humbled again by what a former diplomat called "needless unilateralism" over Kyoto. White House rejection of the protocol just as he was heading to Europe to sell missile defense caught the Secretary by surprise. He doesn't disagree that the treaty is fatally flawed, "but the manner of handling it is another matter," says a top State official. As Powell told TIME, "That's one where, you know, I would have done it differently." His preference is not to ride roughshod over treaties that most of the globe supports if he can find a more subtle way to advance American interests. He told the still nettled Europeans in mid-July that a replacement proposal would emerge by October. Ten days later, Rice declared there was no fixed date, much less a plan.