Quotes of the Day

At its core, the Bush Administration's rationale for going to war with Iraq was simple enough. As the President stated in the fall of 2002, Iraq "possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons, [and] it is seeking nuclear weapons." The central conclusion of the newly issued Duelfer report is also fairly simple: many U.S. assumptions about the state of Iraq's weapons were just plain wrong. Here's a look at some of the key misjudgments — and what we know now.

Biological

WHAT WE THOUGHT THEN Although Iraq claimed in 1995 to have unilaterally destroyed its entire arsenal of anthrax, botulinum and other agents after the first Gulf War, the U.S. continued to insist that Saddam retained a large stockpile, along with mobile labs that could produce and store more agents.

WHAT WE KNOW NOW Iraq probably destroyed all or most of its agents in 1991 and '92, and hadn't shown any interest in biowarfare after it destroyed its al-Hakam bioweapons plant in '96. It now appears that the trailers the U.S. found in May 2003 weren't labs; they were intended for launching hydrogen weather balloons.

Chemical

WHAT WE THOUGHT THEN In the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA stated that "Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF and VX." During his prewar presentation to the U.N., Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that satellite photos taken in May 2002 showed the movement of chemical weapons from a factory to the field.

WHAT WE KNOW NOW Saddam hoped to relaunch a chemical-weapons program once sanctions ended, but the Duelfer report says there are no "credible indications" that Iraq produced any agents after destroying its stockpile in 1991. It concludes that there were no chemical-weapons-related materials found at that site, contrary to Powell's suggestions.

Conventional

WHAT WE THOUGHT THEN Intelligence officials were convinced that after the first Gulf War, Saddam had secretly retained a few dozen Scud-variant missiles, capable of traveling almost 600 miles, and was actively working to develop other long-range delivery systems.

WHAT WE KNOW NOW Iraq was indeed planning on developing long-range ballistic missiles that could travel 600 miles or more, but none of the designs were even close to being produced. At the same time, the Duelfer report states that Iraq did not possess any covert arsenal of Scud-variant missiles.

Nuclear

WHAT WE THOUGHT THEN At the U.N., Powell warned that Saddam had two key components for building a nuclear weapon — the expertise and a working design — and he was doing his best to obtain the third, nuclear material. Powell noted that Iraq had been aggressively trying to acquire aluminum tubes that could be used to enrich uranium.

WHAT WE KNOW NOW Saddam made no serious moves to reconstitute his nuclear program after 1991, though he hoped to someday. The tubes were probably for the production of conventional rockets.

• Daniel Eisenberg