Quotes of the Day

Sunday, Jun. 15, 2003

Open quote

Paris bureau chief James Graff spoke with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, just before work on its proposed European Constitution was completed.

Q: What do you say to persistent criticism that you've favored national governments over the European Commission and Parliament in future EU decision-making?
A: People who make that criticism were fighting for a change in the system, which is to move the balance towards the Commission and to some extent to the Parliament. This group was very active at the beginning of the Convention, and had some support, since they represent the Brussels community. But curiously, they didn't get the support they expected, and the Convention by itself moved in another direction — a position that I support, namely that we need to have a balanced system. If you move too much in one direction or the other, you lose one of the legs of legitimacy for the system. We always need the legitimacy of the nation states and that of the Union. Going one way or the other would imbalance and finally endanger the whole enterprise. It cannot work for long without the acceptance and support of nation states involved; and if it has only the support of nation states, then it's not the European endeavor. What was interesting was that attempts to go one way or another were eliminated more or less by the Convention itself. Now we are working to keep the two pillars. We're trying to impose, simplify stabilize the two pillars. We propose a drastic reform of the Council on one sided, and to bring the Commission back to being a body of 15 prominent people on the other side.

Q: How do you foresee the governments' deliberations on your proposal developing?
A: This intergovernmental conference could be very difficult, because our work was difficult — a lot of people have worked very hard over the last 16 months, and it was just near the end that we were able to reach common positions. They'll have a difficult road to go, if they go too far from our text, they'll have to start the whole process over again.

Q: Any particular stumbling point?
A: The only point which is touchy is where do we keep unanimity and where to we accept majority voting. Everywhere we leave unanimity in place, there will be no action, because with 25 very different countries, you cannot have unanimity. But the areas where unanimity is still required are very sensitive, and you can't change them without causing major political problems. On taxes, for instance: it's under unanimity, and some countries — the Swedes, Danes, Irish and British — are against changing that. If we keep unanimity nothing will happen, but moving to majority voting is unacceptable to them — so we have an inner contradiction. My proposal was to move towards a majority vote only the part of the tax system that could impair fair competition. We already have majority voting on subsidies that undermine competition, so there was a certain symmetry there. But even that was unacceptable. Another case on the other end of the spectrum: social security systems and worker protection in case of lay-offs. The convention wanted to move to majority voting, but practically all countries, either from the left and the right, opposed it. Either they wanted to keep this area and run it under their own philosophy or wanted the unions and employers to deal with it. So moving from unanimity to majority voting will remain a difficult question.

We succeeded in clarifying a question: where and how the Union intervenes. We made an open limitation of competences, which was never clearly made before. There was a strong demand from public opinion to know what the Union does and what the national governments do. That's now set, and it can be changed only by very difficult constitutional amendment. We have some exclusive competences of the Union where it's the main actor, shared competences where the Union and the states act more or less jointly. All the rest is common or national action by the states. It's clear and the instruments are adapted to that situation.

Up to now when you have an issue — employment or growth — there was always a confused demand that Europe should do something. I hope that in the future people will understand that Europe has its role to play and the countries have theirs. You have that in any federal state: education is at the state level, health regulations.

Q: So you think you can head off the pernicious dynamic that all the bad stuff gets pushed to Brussels?
A:I hope so. We did all we could for that. Whenever governments are embarrassed and face an issue they couldn't or wouldn't handle — but should — they all call for European action. That's doubly negative, because they don't do what they should and Europe has no qualification to act. So it's frustrating, and I hope that after our work it won't happen like that. If a matter isn't a European competence, the future chairman of the Union will say to the head of government, this isn't a European matter, you must handle it — do it!

Q: What disappointments do you have about the final draft?
A: I was disappointed that very little attention was paid to people. Very little. There was tension about institutions, about the respective rights of the states and the Union, quite a debate? but not much for the people. But I perceive a demand from the people, so we should have gone to meet them, halfway or at least a third of the way, but we didn't. For instance, I proposed regular meetings between the European parliament and the national parliaments. The people are represented largely by their national deputies, in the way they feel it. A common debate would have given people the impression there was the beginning of a beginning of a European political constituency. But this idea was not accepted because the European Parliament was afraid it would create competition, and the Commission didn't like it either, I don't know why. Beyond that, I tried to put in some lyricism, not for me, but for the people. I tried this in the preamble, and I wanted to have a mention of space exploration, something people could get excited about.

Q: So you fear the European Union could remain unloved and ill-understood?
A: You need to have sense of adhesion, and that's more than interest. You can't build a society purely on interests, you need a sense of belonging. This exists among the young people of Europe. But they're not in power. People in power in the world today aren't interested in the long term achievements, because they're only in power for a short time. So the idea that what they do will be fruitful in 10 or 15 years gets short shrift.

Q: Did you wish you could have reinvented the EU from the beginning, have a kind of blank slate?
A: Well. there was a tabula rasa, a horrible one: the Second World War. The first moves start from there. Then there was a common perception that something horrible had to be eliminated forever, and they knew they had to build new institutions. In the current process, we didn't have that kind of platform; what we had was the fall of the Soviet Empire, which gave us the opportunity to create a global Europe. But this brought forth a demand for participation, not for creation. So we weren't helped by a strong impulse for a new beginning. The case of the U.S. was different in many ways. There you had a relatively small and homogeneous population with very little history behind it. Here we have a long history, an enormous population of 450 million people, and many differences in language, culture, religion. In the U.S., they started with a confederation that had no head — that had been the king of England, and they had to find something else. There was an objective need. In our case it's the reverse: we have too many heads at the top.

Q: Was it a help or a hindrance that you were working out the basis for a European foreign policy amidst the deep differences within Europe over Iraq?
A: It didn't help for the day to day situation, but clearly did for the conception of the future. Take countries like Poland, which are at the moment supportive of the American line. When they make statements in favor of a future expression of Europe, even in foreign policy, it's a demand for the future. My approach was we must do this gradually, like we did for the euro, a process that got started in 1979. I remind you that the euro was created amidst enormous skepticism in the U.S. No one believed we would do it or trusted that we would succeed. The common foreign policy is the same. The idea isn't new, but until now it had very limited results. It's not something for next year or two years, but what we've given here is a road map, to use a common phrase these days. The question of how we vote on a common foreign policy has to be adjusted in steps. We start with an instrument for coordination, but eventually majority voting must become more and more the rule of the game. We need to preserve the ultimate national right to dissent, not to block common action, but to not participate.

Q: What will the EU look like in ten years?
A: We'll be on our second president, our John Adams, if you will. We'll have a foreign minister who will be well known, and we'll have created a clearer identity for the European Union. In the course of the Iraq crisis there have been four Presidencies of the EU — the Spanish, the Danes, the Greeks, and soon the Italians for the post-war phase. That has made it very difficult for Americans to know what Europe stood for. If we had had only one, even if his role were limited, our position might have been more coherent.

Q: Do you think the positions of the Chairman of the European Council and the President of the Commission will eventually merge into one?
A: We avoided measures that would prevent that from happening. But I personally don't think it's a good idea. A single person can't perform all these duties; the chairman will have enough to do without handling the work of the Commission. The key to the success of our system is two branches coordinating: a Commission President in charge of everything in the Union, and a chairman for coordinating common actions among member states.

Q: Does the need for integrated Europe grow out of desire to counter American power?
A: At the moment the fabric of European culture and American culture are different, but that's not to say they're antagonistic. Due to our history, we place an emphasis on peace, legality, and the ability to compromise. We had horrible wars in the 20th century and we don't want to go back down that path. Europeans aren't calling for the same means as Americans; for Europeans the question is how to contribute to a peaceful approach. That doesn't mean being meek, and it doesn't mean we should be confrontational with the U.S. We can act jointly, but we don't always have to agree. In fundamental matters of democracy and free markets, our values are absolutely similar to American values.

Q: Given Europe's problems of slow growth and a shrinking population, can this constitution really mark a renewal?
A: No, the constitution won't do that unless there are new policies formulated within it. The demographic situation can change; the trend is shifting in France and enlargement will create a new dynamic. But what's really lacking in Europe is the strength and dimension of our technical and scientific advances. We need a zone of opportunity for freer and larger action. At the beginning of the 20th century Europe was leading in economics and science. The baton was taken by America around the Second World War, and we accept that. But we shouldn't be at a standstill, and for that we need new policies.

Q: Should this constitution be put to a referendum in Europe?
A: In every country where referendum is the rule, it will be a positive thing. Look at Poland last week: it wasn't just the parliament that opted for EU membership; a referendum made it an expression of the popular will. Britain wants to proceed along its own traditions of representative democracy, and it would be a mistake to interfere with that. But if people are given a chance to support this constitution, they'll feel they built it.

Q: Some members of the Convention think the EU would be further along if it weren't for Britain.
A: It's not true. If one day Britain decides to leave Europe — and they have hesitated two or three times — then the others will go on, and probably speedier. But there is a common perception that Europe is better with British participation; I think that's also best for Britain. The present British government has made a long-term choice for Europe; they are just debating the itinerary.

Q: And your constitutional draft is the sole itinerary for Europe?
A: At first I thought that you combine 25 countries and all these institutions and you come up with a multitude of possible solutions. But after a few months I realized when you take all the constraints into account, you find only one solution. The problem is to formulate it, and to make sure it lasts.

Close quote

  • Q&A with Valéry Giscard D'Estaing
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