Imagine a blueprint for a paint-can-like device spewing hydrogen-cyanide gas gleaned from a computer in Saudi Arabia. Virulent anthrax developed by terrorists in Afghanistan. Most fearful of all, a fateful campfire meeting outside the Kandahar, Afghanistan, where al Qaeda leaders met secretly with a senior Pakistani weapons experts to discuss making al-Qaeda the first nuclear-armed terrorists in history. That's the witch's brew of what the experts call NBC nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It's the terrorists' trifecta and the scary spine of Ron Suskind's new book, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (being released Tuesday by Simon and Schuster). The clear implication: It seems the Bush administration truncated its post-9/11 war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda which were avidly seeking WMDs to take on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, whose WMD programs had been suspended and put into the deep freeze under international pressure.
Suskind's tale that U.S. intelligence believed al-Qaeda plotted a hydrogen-cyanide gas attack on New York City subways in 2003 only to have it aborted by al-Qaeda's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, because, some U.S. intelligence officials surmise, it wouldn't be dramatically bigger than al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks is excerpted in this week's issue of TIME. U.S. intelligence officials have confirmed Suskind's reporting, including Zawahiri's decision to halt the attack. A former Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Suskind is also the author of the 2004 book The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill, which won acclaim as one of the first bare-knuckle accounts of the Bush administration's preoccupation with Saddam and its disdain for independent thinking by Cabinet members.
Suskind insists nothing revealed in the book will give any kind of edge to al-Qaeda. "I very carefully vetted everything making sure it was something al-Qaeda already knew, or that al-Qaeda would not be advantaged by over the past two years," he tells TIME. "Nothing in this book will in any way help those who have destructive intent and violent desires." Beyond the subway-gas plot, there are other disturbing revelations in Suskind's book that will serve as fodder for terror analysts and pundits to debate, and devour, in coming days:
The book challenges the claim, made in Bob Woodward's book Plan of Attack, that CIA chief George Tenet told Bush in late 2002 that the case that Saddam had WMD was a "slam-dunk." That phrase has hung like a noose around Tenet ever since and been widely derided as perhaps the most notorious, and erroneous, claim to justify the invasion of Iraq. Tenet, Suskind says, was stunned to read what he had purportedly told the President when he saw an excerpt from the book in the Washington Post in April 2004. While the President wasn't quoted as a source for that remark, he had been interviewed by Woodward for the book. Tenet "wondered how the President could recall so clearly something Tenet himself didn't remember saying," Susskind writes, and felt the White House was setting him up as a "fall guy" for the bad intelligence that many in the CIA believed came from the Pentagon and members of Vice President Cheney's staff eager to overthrow Saddam.
Such score-settling has a long and honorable history in the annals of Washington reportage. But Suskind won't say if Tenet, or his allies, played a role as Suskind's key sources trying to set the "slam-dunk" record straight. "I can't get into the sourcing," he tells Time.