Quotes of the Day

You remember Ahmad Chalabi. He was once the Bush Administration's favorite Iraqi exile. His group, the Iraqi National Congress, provided all sorts of wondrous reports about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (some of which Judith Miller disseminated in the New York Times). He convinced certified hardfellahs like Vice President Dick Cheney that American troops would be greeted in Baghdad with flowers and candy. He was smooth as oil and wicked smart, with a math degree from M.I.T. More than a few Bush Administration officials hoped Chalabi would quickly take control in Baghdad after Saddam was deposed, and allow the U.S. to get out of Dodge within months.

Wrong, of course. And when the Iraqis proved to be just a bit less welcoming than Chalabi had predicted, and no WMD were found, he fell hard. By the spring of 2004, Chalabi's home was raided by U.S. forces. His associates were suspected of fraud, torture, kidnapping and misuse of U.S. funds. Chalabi was suspected of spying for the Iranians. But nothing much came of that. Chalabi soon leveraged American disapproval into Baghdad street cred and a burgeoning career as a leader of the Shi'ite coalition. He currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister in Ibrahim al-Jaafari's government. And now—trumpet clarion here—he is coming back to Washington in November at the invitation of Treasury Secretary John Snow. But Chalabi will have potentially more significant meetings with National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and perhaps Condoleezza Rice, both of whom—according to high-ranking Administration officials—believe that he is a plausible and acceptable candidate to be the next Prime Minister of Iraq when that nation votes, yet again, for a new government on Dec. 15.

It is the latest signpost in the Bush Administration's hegira from lunatic idealism to utter desperation in Iraq, and it comes at a crucial moment. Iraq's fate--well, the U.S.'s fate in Iraq--will be decided in the next six months. There are few optimists left in the Congress, intelligence community or U.S. military. But the Bush Administration harbors a gossamer strand of hope that the Dec. 15 election will finally produce a strong Iraqi government, a real coalition of Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds. The Administration also realizes it may take a supremely oleaginous political thug, perhaps someone as rare and fetid as Ahmad Chalabi, to bring it off.

The gossamer scenario begins with the assumption that the inept and corrupt al-Jaafari government has discredited itself with the Iraqis. It certainly has no allies left in the Bush Administration. "Jaafari overplayed his hand," says an official, referring to the Prime Minister's overly friendly relations with Iran. There is a possibility that the current ruling alliance of religious Shi'ite parties will split apart. There is the probability that the Grand Ayatullah Ali Husaini Sistani—the most respected religious figure in the country—will not endorse the Shi'ite slate, as he did last time, even if it holds together. There is also the assumption that the Sunnis, having participated in the Oct. 15 constitutional referendum, will become a significant political force in December (despite well-documented ballot stuffing in the recent vote). All of which would create some running room for the formation of a new and creative coalition.

Chalabi is not the Bush Administration's first choice to preside over that coalition. "We have no preferences," a senior Administration official told me. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a tough guy, secular Shi'ite and former CIA client, was the White House's covert favorite in last January's election, but he received only 14% of the vote. Allawi is trying to be a better politician this time, building a coalition slate with prominent Kurds and Sunnis. And he has credibility—and contacts—with the less extreme elements of the Sunni insurgency. But Allawi has limited appeal among religious Shi'ites, and therefore the Bush Administration has hopes for two other possible leaders. One is Adil Abdul Mahdi, said to be among the more pragmatic religious Shi'ite leaders. And then there is Chalabi, who has built a formidable network of Shi'ite associates that includes the radical firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Of course, Chalabi has serious downsides as well—aside from the greasy residue on his resume. The Sunnis don't like him. He has been an advocate of the most extreme and injudicious de-Baathification proposals. When asked how Chalabi might bring the Sunnis back into the fold, an Administration official told me, "You've heard about Nixon to China?" It might be more like Michael Corleone to Cuba. And it must be emphasized that any successful Iraqi government remains the longest of long shots—especially with an insurgency that continues to grow more effective and lethal as the months pass. But wouldn't it be deliriously weird if Ahmad Chalabi turned out to be the top guy after all?

• Joe Klein
• Could Ahmad Chalabi end up running Iraq?