Which is a problem, since unlike other conventional armies that find themselves confounded by poorly armed but elusive guerrilla opponents, the Sri Lankans are now outgunned by their guerrilla enemies. "The LTTE is better armed than the Sri Lankan army," says TIME New Delhi correspondent Meenakshi Ganguly. "In fact, a lot of their weapons once belonged to the army and were usurped by the Tigers when they overran the camps. The Tigers are also much more motivated than the army, which is facing problems of desertion and low recruitment because of the heavy casualties it has suffered in this conflict."
The Sri Lankan army last recovered Jaffna after a bloody battle in 1994, but last week's setback wipes out years of painstaking territorial gains against the guerrillas. Now the government of Chandrika Kumaratunga, which has made taking a hard line against the guerrillas the centerpiece of its tenure, faces the humiliating prospect of having to negotiate a cease-fire with the LTTE in order to save thousands of its soldiers. And the rebels, who are fighting for independence for the mostly Tamil northern provinces they refer to as Eelam (the Hindu Tamil form about 20 percent of Sri Lanka's population, with the majority Sinhalese, who are largely Buddhist, making up about 75 percent) are likely to demand de facto control over the Jaffna peninsula as their price. In acceding to such a demand the government would concede defeat in a campaign that has cost the army thousands of casualties. And even though Kumaratunga's war powers proclamation allows her to shut down newspapers, that's unlikely to stop Sri Lankans from questioning whether the war is worth fighting.