Even as the mopping up phase continues, one thing is clear: The military campaign in Afghanistan has affirmed the overwhelming power of America's war machine — in the eyes of both friend and foe. Saddam Hussein, more than most, has reason to be nervous. President Bush drove home the point Monday in a sharp warning to the Iraqi dictator to readmit United Nations arms inspectors or face unspecified consequences. But that doesn't necessarily mean the war against terrorism is about to target Baghdad.

While the President made his comments in the context of continuing the U.S. campaign against terrorism, his point of attack was Iraq's weapons programs rather than any links to the September 11 strikes, which have thus far proved elusive. President Bush sought to make the link by warning, in the context of his vow to punish states that support terrorism, that "if they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorize nations, they will be held accountable." He demanded that Baghdad allow the resumption of UN arms inspections that ended late in 1998, when the U.S. and Britain launched four days of air strikes to punish the regime for its refusal to open all sites to inspection in line with UN requirements.

A farewell to arms inspections

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nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu) The 1998 showdown left the Iraq standoff mired in a stalemate: UN sanctions could only be lifted once Iraq was certified as having no nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, but such certification was impossible without an unimpeded inspection system. The stalemate worked for Saddam, who was content to allow European and Arab humanitarian concerns over the impact of sanctions to slowly build pressure on the U.S. Even when it tried to revise the embargo with "smart sanctions" designed to target Saddam's weapons programs but ease up on his civilian economy, the Bush administration found little enthusiasm among Saddam's Arab neighbors and at the UN Security Council.

Hawks v. Doves

Bush administration hawks have long called for more robust U.S. support for various Iraqi opposition groups in order to finish what they consider the unfinished business of the Gulf War. But doves have countered that going after Saddam a decade after his ejection from Kuwait would alienate Washington's Arab allies. And on a practical level, many in the U.S. military have been scornful about the potential of the diverse and fractious Iraqi opposition to mount a military challenge to the regime. Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni was even more upfront in his parting testimony on Capitol Hill, warning that overthrowing Saddam would create a dangerous power vacuum. Remember, before 1991, the U.S. had seen Saddam as a strategic counterweight to Iran, and the fact that the majority of Iraq's population is either Shiite Muslim or Kurdish had raised concerns that bringing down the regime could presage a breakup of the country that would destabilize the region. But for the hawks, September 11 and the subsequent anthrax terror highlighted the danger of leaving a regime as noxious as Saddam's intact, and they have been pressing hard for the U.S. to tackle Iraq once Afghanistan is over.

Early on, the dovish camp led by Secretary of State Colin Powell prevailed. Arab regimes would back away from the U.S. if it targeted Iraq, he warned, and without their support taking down Al Qaeda would prove infinitely more difficult. Besides, as he said in an interview published Sunday by the New York Times, "I never saw a plan that was going to take him out. It was just some ideas coming from various quarters about, 'Let's go bomb.'" That strategy had failed in 1998, and there was no reason to believe it would succeed now.

Wrong, say the hawks. They believe Afghanistan has shown just how effective U.S. air power can be when used in conjunction with indigenous proxy forces against a hated regime. If the U.S. invests enough in the Iraqi opposition and then mercilessly bombs the regime's forces, Saddam can be swept out of power like Mullah Omar.

But the hawks have a hard time selling their scenario, and not only because the Baghdad regime is a considerably more formidable foe than the Taliban. Even Britain, which has been Washington's most steadfast anti-Iraq ally, has firmly opposed extending the anti-terror campaign to Iraq. The Brits fear that bombing Iraq in the absence of evidence linking Baghdad directly with the September 11 attacks could produce precisely the sort of Islam vs. the West conflict the Bush administration has been so careful to avoid — and bin Laden has been so eager to provoke.

Saddam where the administration wants him

The absence of allied support may weigh heavily on any decision over Iraq, precisely because of the reluctance of the U.S. to commit troops to complex and dangerous peacekeeping missions. Right now it's hard to imagine that replacing Saddam's regime would require anything less than tens of thousands troops on a relatively permanent basis. And unlike Afghanistan, allies aren't exactly lining up to help Washington go to war in Iraq.

President Bush's comments, of course, are open-ended. There's nothing really new about demanding a resumption of arms inspections. If the timing suggests a renewed interest in going after Saddam, that's probably because debate continues in the administration over what to do about Iraq. And if uncertainty over Washington's intentions following its Afghan victory makes Saddam skittish, that's exactly where the Bush administration wants him.