Chiarelli returned to Iraq last January as commander of the Multinational Corps — in layman's terms, the general in charge of combat operations. Within weeks the Shi'ites were up in arms again, after the bombing of the al-Ashkari Shrine in Samarra. This time, the target of their rage was the Sunni community, not U.S. forces. Shi'ite militias are blamed for much of the killings in Iraq's civil war.
As Chiarelli gets ready to hand over Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno this month, there's some buzz at the Pentagon that he may return for a third tour, to replace Gen. George Casey as the top commanding general in Iraq. A few days before he began to pack his bags, Chiarelli shared his views on Iraq with TIME's Aparisim Ghosh. Exerpts from the interview:
Q. This is your second departure from Iraq. How different does it feel from the previous one?
A. The last time, I felt I was leaving on a high note. After a very difficult year, we were able to hold Iraq's first free elections [on Jan 30, 2005] just before I left. I don't feel like I'm leaving on a high note this time. The sectarian killing — that's the hard part.
Q. There have been rumors in Washington that you may replace Gen. Casey when his tour ends.
A. I don't know about that. I'd like to see this job through to the end — let's leave it at that.
Q. What have been the seminal moments of your tour — moments when you thought, "This changes the battlefield"?
A.The bombing of the Golden Mosque [the Ashkariya Shrine in Samarra] in February — that changed everything. That was the most seminal moment of my entire two years here. That probably surpassed the elections in having an effect on the people. That's where we saw the rise in sectarian violence. There were other moments, like the delay in forming the government [after the Dec. 2005 elections]. We didn't have a government until June. That created a real angst in the community, as they watched this process play out. And it allowed the militias to grow without interference.
Q. What will you miss most about Iraq?
A. Being around soldiers in a fight.
Q: What will you miss least?
A: Writing condolence letters to the families of dead soldiers.
Q: How many have you written as MNC-I commander?
A: [Consults a diary] As of two days ago, 606.
Q: And as 1st Cav commander?
A: [Replies from memory] 169.
Q. Back then, your main fight against the Shi'ite militias was in Najaf.
A. No. Sadr City was a cauldron from August through October ['04]. The problem was pushed to the side because everything was building toward the operation [against Sunni insurgents] in Fallujah and the fight [against the Mahdi Army] in Najaf. Sadr City was constant problem at that time, but everyone was looking at the big fight in Fallujah.
I think the end of the fighting in Najaf was in some ways the impetus for many of the problems we're having today. That's when al-Sadr decided to join the political process. But that's also when the rogue militias really got started, because [some of al-Sadr's supporters] said, "No, we're not going to do that."
We thought the hardest thing was holding the election. But that's relatively easy, compared to trying to get a government started — people setting up a democratic government for the first time, trying to work through everything you have to work through.
Q. Were you surprised by how hard that was, by how long that took?
A. Everyone was surprised by how long it took to form the government. And I think most people agree [the post-election political impasse] caused the militias to grow at the time.