Can This War Be Won?

MAX BECHERER / POLARIS FOR TIME
BLOODIED: U.S. troops inspect a car bombing in Baghdad that left four G.I.s wounded

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So, who's right? Few military or intelligence officials back the rosier assessments of Allawi and the Bush Administration. Neither does a majority of the American public: according to a TIME poll, only 37% say Bush has been truthful in describing the situation in Iraq, and 55% believe it is worse than Bush claims. Even White House officials acknowledge that the U.S. has lost control of swaths of Iraq, including parts of the capital, where insurgents roam with near impunity. While Allawi says 15 of 18 provinces are controlled by forces friendly to the new Iraqi government, that grip is shaky in Sunni areas. Even in the relatively subdued Shi'ite south, coalition forces and their Iraqi recruits face daily harassment from militants loyal to rebel cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. And the military believes that the al-Zarqawi-led insurgency is becoming more ruthless and resilient. "If we don't kill or capture them," says a U.S. general in Iraq, "they move on to fight somewhere else."

However gloomy, the outlook isn't yet hopeless. The Bush Administration's prewar vision of turning Iraq into a beachhead of democracy in the Arab world is indeed remote. But for all the rhetorical sniping on the campaign trail, Bush and Kerry agree with the consensus of policymakers and military commanders in Washington and Iraq: a significant reduction in the U.S. presence is impossible until a credible Iraqi government proves it can defend itself against an insurgency that is likely to persist for years. The range of plausible scenarios if the U.S. were to pull out includes an Islamic state that provides sanctuary to terrorists like al-Zarqawi and a civil war that could draw in neighboring countries like Syria and Iran. "We cannot walk away from this one," says retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, a former head of U.S. forces in the Middle East and a leading critic of the Administration's handling of Iraq. "It would be a colossal failure if we fail to deliver on this."

So no matter who ends up in the White House in January, U.S. troops are staying in Iraq indefinitely possibly in even greater numbers. Pentagon officials say U.S. troop strength there, now at 136,000, could rise by as many as 15,000 during the first four months of 2005, as troops arriving to replace those who have been there for a tour of duty overlap. Bush has refused to set a timetable for a reduction in forces, and insists that "we will stay the course" until Iraq is stabilized. Kerry is trying to convince the public that he can turn things around fast enough to bring the troops home by the end of his first term mainly by pursuing policies that Bush says he's already carrying out. In the TIME poll 46% say Bush is more likely to bring a successful end to the situation in Iraq, while 42% say Kerry would do a better job.

Whoever wins in November will find that success in Iraq remains out of reach until the U.S. makes headway in accomplishing five key goals. Here's what it will take:

1. Get Offensive
As long as insurgents are allowed to operate freely in Iraqi cities like Fallujah, the U.S. has little hope of establishing any lasting order. U.S. commanders are developing plans to eliminate insurgent no-go zones in the Sunni triangle, west and north of Baghdad. "The strategy is to get local control to the maximum extent by December," a U.S. general says. But the U.S. wants to hold off on major combat until sufficient numbers of Iraqi forces are trained and equipped to fight alongside American forces, which isn't likely until after the U.S. presidential election. The participation of Iraqis in the coming offensive is critical for Allawi, who is struggling to establish his independence from the occupiers. But the longer the U.S. waits, the more time it gives the insurgency to spread. "The insurgents are only going to grow stronger and more bold," says Zinni. "We have got to take action more quickly."