When 1st Lieut. Raied showed up for work on April 4 at Camp Eagle, a U.S. Army base in the east Baghdad slum of Sadr City, he knew he wouldn't have much company. The executive officer of the 306th Battalion of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), Raied and other battalion members had been warned by locals not to report for duty after fighting broke out between militants loyal to the Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and U.S. forces. Raied, who like his comrades asked to be identified only by his first name, estimates that only a third of his battalion was willing to brave their neighbors' threats. He was one. But when he got to Camp Eagle, Iraqi security guards manning the gate told Raied he wasn't needed, apparently acting on instructions from U.S. commanders. "When I heard that I was sick at heart," he says. "I knew that the real reason was that the Americans wanted to finish killing people in Sadr City. Our duty is to protect the people. But the Americans don't trust us."

The U.S. says only two Iraqis from Raied's company made it to work that day, after an ambush by al-Sadr's forces killed eight U.S. soldiers. Since then, about 100 of the 700 members of the 306th Battalion have gone missing in action. Of the rest, say the U.S. soldiers at the camp, 90% fail to show up on days of high tension. Those officers who have remained on the job — men like Raied, a former master sergeant in the old Iraqi army — say the bloody fighting that had gripped the country over the past month was a watershed; local people have turned against the U.S. and the ICDC. Morale has been shattered, and many Shi'ites, including members of the ICDC, have become hostile to the U.S. presence. Like most Iraqis, Raied believes the U.S. must give more responsibility to local forces if it hopes to quell the insurgency. But he concedes that his men are nowhere close to ready. "We started from zero. By early April we had got up to 75% of ideal efficiency," he says. "Now we are back to about 25%. If we continue like this I recommend we disband the ICDC, because it is doing nothing for the Iraqi people."

404 Not Found

---

nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)

Coming at a time when the U.S. needs Iraqi help more than ever, that is a brutal assessment. With fresh troops in limited supply and many of Washington's coalition partners bailing out, U.S. commanders have spent months scrambling to train and push forward Iraqi security and police forces who can relieve exhausted U.S. troops, lift the U.S.'s footprint from the occupation and maintain law and order after June 30, when the U.S. plans to turn over sovereignty to a caretaker Iraqi government. The results aren't encouraging. Military officials say that in areas where anti-U.S. violence broke out early this month, only half the local members of the ICDC, an estimated 31,000-man force created by the U.S. last June to maintain security in Iraq, remained at their posts. General Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division, says "40% walked off the job because they were intimidated, and 10% actually worked against us." In Fallujah, all but 15 of the 2,200 U.S.-trained Iraqi troops deserted when the Marines moved into the city; the Marines had to confiscate the equipment and weapons of deserters to prevent them from aiding the insurgents. In the Shi'ite-dominated south, Iraqi police watched idly as members of al-Sadr's Medhi Army seized their buildings, weapons and vehicles. The inability or unwillingness of the Iraqis to help suppress the twin uprisings forced U.S. officials to admit publicly last week what many have assumed for months. General John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), says Iraqi security forces won't be ready to assume control until September at the earliest.

But with popular hostility to U.S. forces threatening to boil over, the U.S. may not be able to wait. In response to the dismal performance of its Iraqi recruits this month, the military has sent General David Petraeus, the celebrated commander of the 101st Airborne Division, back to Iraq to oversee the recruitment and training of new Iraqi military personnel. U.S. Administrator L. Paul Bremer reversed his year-old decree banning senior members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party from holding any government jobs — a policy that gutted Iraq's military and police of most of their top leaders. The U.S. hopes that bringing unemployed officers back into the fold will improve the morale and professionalism of the security forces and begin to erode the core of support for the insurgency, particularly in the Sunni badlands.

That task has been made more daunting by the insurgents' ability to intimidate, threaten and often kill Iraqis cooperating with U.S. forces. Three police stations in Basra were attacked last week by suicide bombers, killing 68 people. In Baghdad, police officers say they patrol only when they absolutely have to, and spend much of their time trying to avoid being connected to their U.S. employers. Many wear masks to hide their identities. "All the policemen are afraid," says Sergeant Walid Hani Hamid. "People think the Iraqi police are walking hand in hand with the Americans. We are forced to sneak back to our houses the way the mukhabarat did during Saddam's time."