Into The Cauldron

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That's why the White House and Pentagon moved quickly to formulate the right response. President Bush spoke last Thursday with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General John Abizaid, the head of U.S. Central Command (Centcom), to discuss how to retaliate. According to a senior Administration official, Abizaid called for "a specific and overwhelming attack to restore justice." It would be accompanied by an information campaign that would spread the word "that this won't be tolerated," the senior official said. The decision by commanders in the field to respond with such force, he added, "obviously pleased" Bush. "He understands that [the enemy] is trying to rattle us and break our will. It's important that we demonstrate our resolve, and this is what he wanted to hear."

No one doubted that the military's response would be massive. "We have to win this war in Fallujah one neighborhood at a time," said U.S. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, deputy head of operations in Iraq. "We're going to do it on our terms, on our timeline, and it will be overwhelming." In a reflection of the anger the attacks induced, coalition officials said trying to earn the affection of local Iraqis was no longer the objective at least not when it came to responding in Fallujah. "In no meeting that I have been in has anybody mentioned the hearts-and-minds issue," says a senior coalition official. "That's simply not the issue right now." Still, the retribution and the message accompanying it couldn't come fast enough. Economically, the fallout was immediate. A Baghdad investment expo, which for months the Administration had aggressively pushed to get private-sector money flowing into the country, was delayed indefinitely. More than 200 companies had signed up for the conference, which was to have begun April 5. "This is not an environment in which people can conduct peaceful business," says Mohammed al-Eshaiker, 51, formerly of Irvine, Calif., but now in Baghdad looking for real estate deals. "A lot of companies are going to say, 'Let's wait a month or two or a year or two and reassess the security situation after that.' For Iraqis, that's serious."

The Fallujah attacks raised questions again about how eager the U.N. will be to assume a larger role in sorting out the future governance of Iraq something the U.S. desperately wants to bring about. The U.N.'s envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, is due back in Iraq this week to help hash out what the post June 30 political arrangement will be. The carnage could also complicate the Administration's efforts to shift some of the burden for pacifying Iraq to its allies. The new Spanish government had already vowed to pull out its 1,300 troops in the wake of the Madrid terrorist attacks last month. Retired General Anthony Zinni, a former Centcom commander, argues that part of the solution to Iraq's security problems is to internationalize the occupation. But last week's scenes hardly seemed likely to entice volunteers.

Among the many questions that remain unanswered is whether the horror in Fallujah represented an isolated spasm of mob violence or a more corrosive, widespread streak of anti-American hatred. On Saturday, Shi'ite followers of firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr marched and burned American flags, promising if asked to be the hand of Hamas and Hizballah in Iraq. But galling as the images in Fallujah were, U.S. commanders say the city and the surrounding area remain a uniquely difficult problem, with little bearing on what's happening in the rest of the country. The military continues to believe that the insurgents while still capable of killing small numbers of soldiers with "standoff" weapons like roadside bombs are no match for U.S. firepower. "Look," says a Pentagon official, "Fallujah is a problem right now, but we'll deal with it." In recent months U.S. forces have claimed some success in subduing resistance in other Sunni-triangle hot spots. That includes Tikrit, Saddam's hometown, where the military responded to attacks by demolishing homes and cordoning off the entire city with barbed wire. The military has avoided such blunt tactics in Fallujah, a town 35 miles west of Baghdad that has long been prone to unrest and intense tribal rivalries. Even under Saddam, locals resisted control: the town erupted in murderous riots in 1997 when Saddam arrested a prominent general from the area. Since Saddam's removal, Fallujah has been hostile to the presence of Americans. Nearly a year ago, soldiers stationed in the town opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators, killing 15 civilians. The incident sparked a mood of mutual antagonism that has sporadically erupted into clashes. In November insurgents shot down a U.S. helicopter outside the city, killing 16. And earlier this year bandits broke into a city jail and freed dozens of prisoners.