Summary Judgment

Who bears more responsibility for overstating the significance of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in the months leading up to the war the CIA, which gathered the intelligence now in question, or the White House, which may have pumped up that intelligence for its own purposes? A knowledgeable source tells TIME that the Senate Intelligence Committee, looking for answers, is ready to renew a request for the summary prepared for the President of an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)--the consensus of intelligence agencies on Iraq. The White House previously denied such a request, calling the document privileged. But a source familiar with the situation tells TIME that having voted to expand its inquiry to cover whether the White House hyped Iraq's WMD capabilities, the panel is poised "to again pursue those types of briefing materials."

Why is the summary so crucial? Critics have accused Bush's team of ignoring the important caveats that accompanied intelligence estimates about Iraq's suspected WMD. Analysts with Air Force intelligence, for instance, took issue with the assertion hinted at by President Bush in a speech in October 2002--that Iraq was building a fleet of unmanned aircraft with which to deploy its chemical and biological arsenal. During a Feb. 5 speech at Georgetown University, CIA Director George Tenet cited the NIE, insisting, "Analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs, and those debates were spelled out in the estimate." The panel wants to see whether the caveats were included in the summary the White House got. If they were specified but ignored, the memo could embarrass Bush. If they weren't, it could embarrass Tenet. Either way, the memo could fuel the controversy swirling around how the White House made its case for going to war with Iraq and could drive a wedge between Bush and the CIA director, whom the President has so far stood firmly behind.