Troops or Consequences

What does it cost to stop a war? In the post-cold war era, the answer, it seems, is always the same: American troops.

On the last occasion in the Balkans, to pacify Bosnia, it took NATO bombs, three weeks of shouting, pleading diplomacy at Dayton, Ohio, and 20,000 U.S. troops to help enforce the peace. Now will the U.S. have to pay the same to end the killing in Kosovo? The Clinton Administration has long winced at the idea of going that far into the quicksand of Serbia's Kosovo province. But in defiance of the U.S.-brokered October cease-fire, the Serbs continue to massacre ethnic Albanians, and the implacable rebels keep smuggling in weaponry to pick off Serb forces, as both sides ready for a spring onslaught. So, last week the Clinton Administration and its NATO allies began the same risky investment to bring some kind of peace to Kosovo.

Their plan--coupling a prescription for political settlement with threats of military action if the deal fails--took firm shape, officials told TIME, when the Administration privately decided after the Serb massacre of ethnic Albanians at Racak on Jan. 15 that G.I.s would have to be deployed as peacekeepers. With that decision in her purse, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sped through Europe last week, pushing the allies into an ultimatum that essentially orders Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic to sign an agreement on autonomy with Kosovo's ethnic Albanians within three weeks. If he doesn't, NATO formally warned him last Saturday that he will face bomb and missile attacks from the alliance's planes and ships. The fractious Albanian groups, including the hard-line guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (K.L.A.), are also on notice that they must do the same, though NATO is vague about how they will be punished if they don't. If the plan works, Kosovo would end up with a large degree of self-rule inside Serbia--and NATO would put in troops, including Americans, to secure it.

Until last week, neither the U.S. nor NATO was willing to be so bold. But spurred by the resumption of civilian slaughter, Albright insisted it was time the allies demand "an interim political settlement." All right, replied the allies, but only if the U.S. will follow through: peacekeepers must go in on the ground for years to make an agreement stick, and American troops must be among them. Administration officials did not say so publicly, but they signaled NATO for the first time--and confirmed to TIME--that they were willing to go along.

The Serbs and the disparate Albanian groups have until Feb. 6 to sit down in a chateau in Rambouillet, 30 miles from Paris. Then they have a week, or at most two, to sign a formal pact in which Kosovo gets its autonomy for three years and Milosevic keeps his hands off. In 2002 the parties to the struggle, presumably cooled off, can negotiate a final arrangement.

This may be what the U.S. and NATO want, but it is not what the people doing the fighting and killing say they are after. The ethnic Albanians agree on little but a vow to settle for nothing less than full independence. U.S. diplomats insist that the K.L.A. rebels "will get the message" not to play the spoiler. Milosevic declares he will not negotiate with the K.L.A. "terrorists" and will never allow foreign troops to enter Serbian territory. Washington believes he "understands" the language of force and will cave.

If the warring parties do not show up at the bargaining table, or if they fail to agree, NATO swears it will bomb. But for how long, and where? Milosevic might assume the role of Saddam of Serbia, gritting through attacks on his security forces and emerging to claim a victim's victory. Or this could be an out for Milosevic. Although the insurrection is nothing but trouble for his sanction-strapped country, he can't just hand Kosovo over. But he may welcome the chance to be forcibly shorn of it and blame NATO. If the Albanians unilaterally block a deal, the U.S. warns there will be no air strikes on the Serbs and no Western intervention on the ground.

Success at Rambouillet, if it comes, will carry a surprise for most Americans. Clinton still has to convince the nation that it's a good idea to provide up to a third of the peacekeeping force, estimated at 25,000, for an open-ended and risky mission. In Bosnia, U.S. forces were to be out in a year, but 6,900 are still on the ground after three years. This time three years will be the minimum. Some senior Republicans, including Bob Dole, are for it. John Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, says that since a U.S. general commands NATO, American troops should take part in its efforts "wherever it will be in the world." When you're the sole surviving superpower, that's the price you have to pay.