Bugging Saddam

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U.S. officials concede that the NSA buglets did record information that could be used to track Saddam's security team and provide details on possible bombing targets. But it provided no more than incremental help. After all, the U.S. was already focusing massive intelligence resources against Iraq, so the contribution of a few small taps was like the patter of raindrops on a lake. Explains a senior intelligence official: "There was useful information, but it helped us only moderately." Anyway, asks another senior spy, if they happened to pick up something interesting, "are we supposed to put our fingers in our ears?"

Like the inspectors, the tiny bugs are out, carried away in the baggage when the U.N. left Iraq last December (officials wanted to make sure the Iraqis would never find them). They will probably never go back. Clinton Administration officials are convinced that senior members of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's staff, if not Annan himself, leaked statements of his "concern" about U.S. intelligence assistance in order to smear Butler and put an end to UNSCOM as it is constituted at present.

Butler is a tough, outspoken Australian and under his direction the inspectors have been willing to call the Iraqis on their cheating. He and Annan, who favors a less confrontational approach to Iraq, have been known to butt heads and, insiders said, what better way to get rid of Butler than to float tales of his collaboration with U.S. spies? Butler, clearly flustered by the revelations, hinted last week that he might not stay around after his appointment expires in June. He could go sooner if the Security Council does nothing to revive inspections.

And it probably will not. A significant faction at the U.N., including not only staff members close to Annan but also three members of the Security Council--China, France and Russia--would like to see UNSCOM replaced by monitors who could work more harmoniously with the Iraqis. Presumably they would do that by avoiding confrontations--that is, serious inspections. If that plan were carried out, Saddam and his hidden weapons would be home free, and he could begin switching his image from victim to victor. But even then--especially then--Reported by William Dowell/U.N. and Mark Thompson and Douglas Waller/Washington