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"Wiranto was the guarantor of the transition that began under Habibie," says Dowell. "Even Habibies most unpopular decisions, such as the referendum on East Timor, are unlikely to have been undertaken without discussing them first with the military. Habibie was useful to Wiranto, because he could take the flak for some tough decisions." Although they pilloried Habibie over East Timor, all the major factions in the national assembly voted Tuesday to accept the results of the independence referendum.
Habibies mandate was to prepare the country for this years presidential election, but in the end he was only one of a number of political options with which the military could accommodate its interests. When it became clear that public animosity toward Suhartos handpicked successor made him an unlikely vehicle for stability, General Wiranto declined his offer of the vice presidency and condemned Habibie to political oblivion.
Although Habibies demise may have suggested to Megawati that her ascendancy was unstoppable, there were powerful forces ranged against it. The scion of Indonesias left-leaning nationalist first president, Sukarno, Megawati had won the most votes in the June election, but her populist appeal to the parliament of the streets and her refusal to cut political deals in the backrooms made her an unpalatable choice for the political and military elite. Her militancy and her gender also left the countrys Islamic parties reluctant to accept her as president, which opened the way for Wahid — a former Megawati ally, known popularly by his nickname Gus Dur, who had broken with her over her reliance on mass protest. He managed to cobble together the votes of the Islamic parties, Habibies Golkar party and those of the militarys 38 delegates into a winning anti-Megawati coalition. Then Gus Dur quickly headed off an expected deluge of protest by offering her the vice presidency.
The Number 2 job gave Megawati something substantial to show for urging her supporters to accept the presidential result. "Further protests and unrest would have ultimately worked against her," says Dowell, "They would have alienated both the military and a large section of the population, many of whom see Wahids victory as a good compromise. Remember, even though Megawati won more votes than her rivals, she still only had the support of a third of the population. At the same time, though, excluding her would have left the situation deeply unstable, and instability bedevils Indonesias prospects for economic recovery."
Having resolved whose hands are going to be on the wheel, the 17,000-island nation still faces a long and perilous journey back to stability and prosperity. While the new parliament has bade farewell to its former colony in East Timor, it faces the vexing problem of secessionist rumblings in Aceh, Ambon, Irian Jaya and elsewhere. And although the economy has been stabilized since last years free fall, restoring the confidence of the international investment community will demand banking reforms that may yet imperil the positions of a number of members of the Suharto elite.
But stark challenges notwithstanding, the apparent peaceful resolution of the explosive social conflicts that began in the spring of 1998 is a monumental achievement — and a rare instance of a diverse group of politicians managing to rise above their immediate, narrow interests. The principal players in this particular Javanese shadow play can take a well-earned curtain call.