Promising Safety, the U.N. Led East Timor to the Slaughter

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Despite the wishes of 80 percent of the population as expressed through a referendum organized by the international community, geopolitical considerations are likely to once again leave Western arms folded as the Timorese suffer another pummeling. The U.S. and Britain insist that keeping the peace in East Timor is Indonesia's responsibility despite considerable evidence suggesting that at best the Indonesian military is standing by passively as the anti-independence militias wreak havoc, and that at worst they're actually sponsoring those militias and oppose sending in a U.N. peacekeeping mission. This may be simple realism: Indonesia has made clear that it won't accept foreign troops in the region, and peacekeeping forces aren't about to fight their way in. This isn't Kosovo, after all although cynics may be tempted to ask whether that's simply because the victims aren't European, or because Indonesia, unlike Serbia, is a longtime ally of the NATO countries.

The geopolitical calculations are, however, more complex than in Kosovo: Indonesia is the key state in the region both politically and economically, and right now it's teetering on the brink of a cataclysmic implosion. Different political factions are vying to fill the void left by last year's ouster of the dictator Suharto, the once-booming economy of the world's fourth most populous country is in the doldrums, and all across the ethnically diverse 13,000-island archipelago there are secessionist rumblings. Western leaders fear that forcing the Indonesian military to give way to foreign troops may spark a nationalist backlash in which the generals stop Indonesia's hesitant democratization. They're also reluctant to encourage secessionist tendencies in Indonesia proper. And a U.N.-authorized peacekeeping mission would require China's approval, which would be highly unlikely given Beijing's reluctance in light of its own plethora of secessionists to approve Kosovo-style peacekeeping operations.

Even simply putting pressure on Indonesia to carry out its commitment to maintain the security of the East Timorese is difficult, because Western leaders fear that the obvious pressure point denying economic assistance could trigger further financial turbulence throughout Asia.

What was at stake in East Timor in 1975 was the outcome of the Cold War; what may be at stake now is the future of Indonesia. Either way, the Timorese lose. Currently it appears they'll be disappointed if they expect much more from the international community than a lot of sympathetic clucking.

Newsfile: East Timor