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Premise 4: Russia wont stand in NATOs way in Kosovo
For some time now, Russias dire financial straits have prompted many in Washington to ignore Moscow on the international stage. The assumption is that poverty renders Russians powerless to resist, and that no matter how angry they may be over NATOs bombing of Yugoslavia, Moscows dependency on Western aid forces it to do Washingtons bidding.
Rude Awakening 4: Kosovo threw Russia into a crisis and has prompted it to begin pursuing its own foreign policy agenda, even where that risks confrontation with NATO
After it started bombing without a clear exit strategy, NATO turned to Moscow to forge a diplomatic settlement. Despite Russias fierce opposition to the bombing, it eventually delivered Milosevics signature on a compromise peace deal by making clear that it wouldnt back further resistance. But that peace deal wasnt the total victory NATO wanted to paint it as, and Moscows perception that it was being shut out of a significant role in the U.N.-authorized peacekeeping mission appears to have been the last straw for Russian generals, who believed their political leaders had been too pliant. The Russian seizure of Pristina airport is a warning shot across Washingtons bow, signaling that Moscows financial crisis doesnt disqualify it as a geopolitical player.
Premise 5: The Kosovo Liberation Army will play ball with NATO
The peace agreement requires NATO to demilitarize the KLA at the same time as it denies the insurgents their goal of independence. Western policy makers believe that the movement will not risk a confrontation with NATO, and will accept the limited-autonomy deal enshrined in the agreement.
Rude Awakening 5: The KLAs cooperation with NATO has been based on a shared enemy rather than shared objectives, and it remains committed to goals opposed by the alliance
Even at the Rambouillet talks, the KLA signaled their independence from NATO by initially refusing to sign a deal that didnt guarantee them independence. They were subsequently brought on board by the argument that their adoption of Rambouillet was essential to allow NATO to bomb the Serbs, and that the agreement would be reviewed after three years and take account of the "will of the people." Having fought the Serb army on the ground at heavy cost - and perhaps even inspired by the example of the Russians independent action in Pristina - the KLA may well be tempted to simply present NATO with new facts on the ground in pursuit of their goals. Certainly, they show little sign of disarming willingly.